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Abstract:  
We investigate the efficiency of piece-rate contracts using data from a field 
experiment, conducted within a tree-planting firm. During the experiment, the piece 
rate paid to planters was exogenously increased. Regression methods yield an 
estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to changes in the piece rate of 0.39. 
Regression methods are limited in their ability to predict the performance of 
alternative contracts. Therefore, we apply structural methods to interpret the 
experimental data. Our structural estimate of the elasticity is 0.37, very close to the 
regression estimate. Importantly, our structural model is identified without imposing 
profit maximization. This allows us to evaluate the optimality of the observed contract. 
We simply measure the profit distance between the observed contract and the profit-
maximizing contract, evaluated at the structural parameter estimates. We estimate 
this distance to be negligible, suggesting that the observed contract closely 
approximates the expected-profit maximizing contract under asymmetric information. 
Under complete information, expected profits would increase by approximately 
fourteen percent, holding expected utility constant. 
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1. Introdution and Motivation
Worker performane under dierent ontrats plays a entral role in the modern
theory of the rm. Eonomi theorists have modelled the ability of ontrats to align
the interests of workers and rms; see, for example, Hart and Holmstrom (1987),
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Baker (1992). In
the related and reently-developed eld of personnel eonomis | see, for example,
Lazear (1998) | ompensation systems are onsidered poliy instruments of the rm
whih an be used to improve the performane of workers and the prots of rms.
Reently, researhers have used data from payroll reords to estimate the eets of
ontrats on worker and rm performane. The observed variation in ontrats is
related to observed measures of performane in order to estimate inentive eets
and to measure the importane of asymmetri information; examples inlude Ferrall
and Shearer (1999), Paarsh and Shearer (1999, 2000), Lazear (2000), Haley (2003),
Copeland and Monnet (2003), Shearer (2004), as well as Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul (2004).
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Despite the growing number of data sets available for analyzing inentive models,
little is known of the eÆieny of observed ontrats within rms. Do observed on-
trats maximize prots? At one level, the answer is obviously no. Optimal ontrats
take into aount all relevant information and are typially ompliated, nonlinear
funtions; see Holmstrom (1979). Observed ontrats, on the other hand, are often
simple, linear funtions of output; see Stiglitz (1991). Explanations of these dier-
enes typially involve the added osts of implementing ompliated ontrats; see, for
example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) as well as Ferrall and Shearer (1999). The
relevant empirial question is perhaps: Do observed ontrats maximize prots within
a subset of easily-implemented | loal | alternatives? However, even this question
an be diÆult to answer. Redued-form eonometri methods annot reover the
strutural parameters that would permit one to ompare the prot performane of
1
For reviews of this literature, see Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanie (2003).
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dierent ontrats, while strutural eonometri methods typially impose prot max-
imization to obtain identiation of tehnologial and preferene parameters. While
imposing the hypothesis of prot maximization allows one to ompare prots aross
ontrats, the optimality of the observed ontrat is maintained, so annot be tested.
Evaluating the loal optimality of observed ontrats requires identifying stru-
tural parameters without imposing prot maximization. One strategy is to obtain
eonometri identiation using only a subset of the onstraints implied by a om-
plete eonomi model. In eonomi models of ontrats, researhers typially impose
multiple onstraints on the rm's hoie of a ontrat. For example, in the standard
prinipal-agent model, the rm hooses a ontrat to maximize expeted prots sub-
jet to inentive ompatibility as well as a partiipation onstraint. Below, we show
that it is possible to identify the parameters of an empirial prinipal-agent model
using a subset of these onstraints, exluding expeted-prot maximization on the
part of the rm. This strategy allows us to alulate expeted prots onditional on
the estimated parameters and to ompare the prots of the observed ontrats with
other, loal alternatives.
Our data ome from a eld experiment onduted within a tree-planting rm
operating in British Columbia, Canada. Workers in this rm are typially paid piee
rates: A worker's daily earnings are stritly proportional to the number of trees he or
she planted during a given day. Planting is performed on large trats of land alled
bloks. Under non-experimental onditions, the piee rate for a partiular blok is
hosen by the rm as a funtion of planting onditions | the slope of the terrain to
be planted, the softness of the soil, and so forth. When onditions render planting
diÆult, reduing the number of trees that an be planted on a given day, the rm
inreases the piee rate in order to satisfy a labour-supply onstraint. Sine planting
onditions are unobserved by the eonometriian, the orrelation between planting
onditions and piee rates indues endogeneity. In fat, a regression of observed
produtivity on piee rates using non-experimental data yields a negative relationship.
Previous work by Paarsh and Shearer (1999 and 2000) has used strutural eono-
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metri methods to solve for endogeneity problems in non-experimental ontratual
data. Here, we exploit experiments. Experiments provide a simple, yet powerful way
to solve endogeneity problems (Burtless, 1995). As in Shearer (2004) we apply both
unrestrited and strutural eonometri methods to the experimental data. However,
whereas Shearer (2004) was primarily onerned with omparing produtivity under
piee rates and xed wages, exploiting his strutural model to generalize experimen-
tal results to nonexperimental settings, here we seek to test the prot-maximization
hypothesis.
Our experiment took plae on three dierent bloks during the 2003 planting
season. During the experiment, eah homogeneous blok was divided into two parts,
one part to be planted at the regular piee rate (as determined by onditions), while
the other to be planted at an experimental (treatment) piee rate. The treatment
piee rate represented an inrease of up to twenty perent over the regular piee
rate. Partiipants in the experiment were observed under both the regular and
the treatment piee rate for a given blok. In total, the experiment generated 197
observations on daily produtivity, 109 at regular piee rates and 88 at treatment
piee rates.
We begin our analysis of these data using regression methods. These methods
provide an unrestrited estimate of the treatment eet of inreasing the piee rate.
We estimate the elastiity of worker produtivity with respet to experimental hanges
in the piee rate to be 0:39. We also investigated the importane of potentially
onfounding fators, suh as weather, fatigue, and endogenous partiipation, but
found them to be unimportant, both eonomially and statistially.
The regression estimates have no diret interpretation in terms of eonomi fun-
damentals. What is more, they are limited in their ability to predit behaviour under
alternative ontrats, not observed in the experiment; see Wolpin (1995). To un-
dertake suh a omparison, we turned to strutural methods. We used information
gathered during extensive disussions with rm managers to guide our modelling of
worker and rm deision-rules over eort and the ontrat. We model the hoie of
3
ontrat as satisfying a worker's partiipation onstraint, subjet to optimal eort
hoies on the part of workers. This allows us to apture the orrelation between
planting onditions and the piee rate, without imposing expeted-prot maximiza-
tion. Inorporating these deision rules into the estimation strategy admits iden-
tiation of the model's parameters and estimation via the methods of maximum
likelihood. The maximum-likelihood estimate of the elastiity of output with respet
to the piee rate is 0:37, very lose to the unrestrited regression estimate.
We evaluated ontratual performane at the maximum-likelihood estimates
of the strutural model, omparing expeted prots realized under the observed
ontrat with those attainable under alternative ontrats. The observed ontrat
is a onstrained, linear ontrat; the base wage is set to zero. To test the hypothesis
that this ontrat maximizes expeted prots, we derived the optimal, unonstrained,
linear ontrat, onsisting of a piee rate and a base wage. We found that this ontrat
would have a negligible eet on rm expeted prots. This suggests that the observed
ontrat is a lose approximation to the expeted-prot maximizing ontrat, at least
among a loal set of alternative ontrats.
Our results also suggest that the rm foregoes large gains by failing to tailor its
ontrats to individual abilities, pointing to the likely importane of intertemporal
ommitment, one worker types are revealed. In partiular, introduing an individual-
spei base wage into the ontrat would inrease the rm's expeted prots by
approximately fourteen perent, leaving workers indierent between the base-wage
ontrat and the observed ontrat. Expeted prots would inrease by approximately
forty-ve perent were the rm to use the base-wage ontrat to apture rents from
the workers.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next setion, we desribe the tree-
planting industry in British Columbia as well as the ompensation system in the
rm. In setion 3, we desribe our experiment's design, while in setion 4 we desribe
the sample data and present the ANOVA results. In setion 5, we onsider the
potential onfounding eets of fatigue and weather, while in setion 6 we onsider
4
experimental and strutural identiation of eort-elastiity parameters. In setion
7, we perform poliy analysis and, in setion 8, we onlude.
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2. Institutional Details
2.1. Tree Planting in British Columbia
While timber is a renewable resoure, ative reforestation an inrease the speed
at whih forests regenerate and also allows one to ontrol for speies omposition,
something that is diÆult to do in the ase of natural regeneration. Reforestation
is entral to a steady supply of timber to the North Amerian market. In British
Columbia, extensive reforestation is undertaken by both the Ministry of Forests and
the major timber-harvesting rms.
Prior to the harvest of any trat of oniferous timber, random samples of ones
are taken from the trees on the trat, and seedlings are grown from the seeds ontained
in these ones. This ensures that the seedlings to be replanted are ompatible with the
loal miro-limates and soil, and representative of the historial speies omposition.
Tree planting is a simple, yet physially exhausting, task. It involves digging a
hole with a speial shovel, plaing a seedling in this hole, and then overing its roots
with soil, ensuring that the tree is upright and that the roots are fully overed. A
worker's produtivity depends on his/her eort level as well as the terrain on whih
he/she is planting. In general, the terrain an vary a great deal from site to site.
In some ases, after a trat has been harvested, the land is prepared for planting by
removing the natural build-up of organi matter on the forest oor so that the soil is
exposed, also known as sreeng. Beause seedlings must be planted diretly in the
soil, sreeng simplies planting. Sites that are relatively at, that are free of roks,
or that have been sreefed are muh easier to plant than sites that are very steep or
have not been sreefed. The typial density of seedlings is between 1200 and 1800
stems per hetare, an inter-tree spaing of about 2:4 to 2:8 metres.
2
Depending on
the onditions and eort, an average planter an plant between 700 and 1100 trees
per day, about half an hetare.
2
One hetare is an area 100 metres square, or 10,000 square metres. Thus, one hetare is
approximately 2.4711 ares.
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Typially, tree-planting rms are hosen to plant seedlings on harvested trats
through a proess of ompetitive bidding. Depending on the land-tenure arrangement,
either a timber-harvesting rm or the Ministry of Forests will all for sealed-bid
tenders onerning the ost per tree planted, with the lowest bidder's being seleted
to perform the work. The prie reeived by the rm per tree planted is alled the
bid prie. Bidding on ontrats takes plae in the late autumn of the year preeding
the planting season, whih runs from early spring through late summer. Before the
bidding, the prinipals of the tree-planting rms typially view the land to be planted
and estimate the ost at whih they an omplete the ontrat. This estimated ost
depends on the expeted number of trees that a worker will be able to plant in a day
whih, in turn, depends on the general onditions of the area to be planted.
Planters are predominantly paid using piee-rate ontrats, although xed-wage
ontrats are sometimes used instead. Under piee-rate ontrats, planters are paid in
proportion to their output. Generally, no expliit base wage or prodution standard
exists, although rms are governed by minimum-wage laws. Output is typially
measured as the number of trees planted per day, although area-based shemes are
used, albeit infrequently. An area-based sheme is one under whih workers are paid
in proportion to the area of land they plant in a given day, assuming a partiular
seedling density.
2.2. Experimental Firm
Our data were olleted at a medium-sized, tree-planting ompany. This ompany
is divided into four ontrating units, eah under the ontrol of a separate manager.
Eah manager is responsible for bidding on ontrats, hiring workers, and setting
piee rates. Essentially, eah manager runs an independent rm. Our data are from
one of these rms.
At any time, eah manager employs between ten and twenty planters. The
planters work under the supervision of foremen, approximately one foreman per ten
planters. The foremen are responsible for supplying trees to the planters as well as
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monitoring the quality of planting. Trees that are poorly planted have a lower survival
rate than those that are planted well. Depending on the land tenure arrangement,
the quality of planting is evaluated by either the government or a timber-harvesting
rm, one the ontrat is ompleted. Lower-than-aeptable quality subjets the rm
to nes. Therefore, the rm monitors its planters losely; poorly-planted trees must
be replanted at the planter's expense.
3
Workers in this rm are typially paid piee rates. Daily earnings are stritly
proportional to the number of trees planted on a partiular day; no base wage is
inluded in the ontrat. Bloks to be planted are divided into plots, eah alloated
to an individual worker for planting. For eah blok, the rm deides on a piee rate.
This rate takes into aount the expeted number of trees that a worker an plant in
a day and the expeted wage the rm wants to pay. Steep, roky, unprepared terrain
slows the planter down, rendering planting more diÆult. Consequently, for a given
piee rate workers prefer to plant in easy terrain sine they an earn more money for
less eort. To indue workers to plant trees in diÆult terrain the rm inreases the
piee rate, satisfying a partiipation onstraint.
It is important to note that under non-experimental onditions the piee rate
is the same for all plots in an entire blok. No systemati mathing of workers to
planting onditions ours in this rm so, even though planters may be heterogeneous,
the piee rate reeived is independent of planter harateristis.
3. Experimental Design
The experiment took plae on three separate bloks, over a three-month period.
During the experiment, eah homogeneous blok was divided into two parts. One
of these parts was then randomly hosen to be planted under the regular piee rate,
the other to be planted under the treatment piee rate. The treatment piee rate
represented an inrease of between eight and twenty perent above the regular piee
rate.
3
Problems onerning quality are relatively rare; none is present in our experimental data.
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Two limitations in the design of the experiment warrant disussion. First, in
order to avoid any possible Hawthorne eets, the experimental hange in the piee
rate was presented to the workers within the ontext of the normal daily operations
of the rm.
4
To aomplish this, the rm presented the treatment bloks as separate
bloks on whih planting onditions had hanged sine the original bid.
5
While this
was onvining to the workers, it required spatial separation of the plots to be planted
under eah piee rate. As suh, individual plots ould not be randomly assigned to
regular and treatment piee rates, but rather half of the blok was randomly assigned
to regular and half to treatment piee rates.
The need to present the experiment within the natural workings of the rm
also restrited the temporal design of the experiment. Bloks, large enough to
aommodate all workers at one, are typially planted sequentially. This ensures
that all workers are planting under similar onditions on the same day. Consequently,
the planting under the regular piee rate was ompleted before the planting under the
higher treatment piee rate.
4. Sample Data and Endogeneity Problems
Our data set ontains information on the regular piee rate set for eah blok, whih
we shall denote by r, and the piee rate reeived by eah planter, whih we shall
denote by
~p =

p > r for treatment-group observations
r for ontrol group observations,
as well as that planter's daily produtivity, whih we shall denote by Y .
In Table 1, we present summary statistis onerning all 197 observations from
the experiment. A total of 21 workers were observed during the experiment, planting
4
Workers who know they are taking part in an experiment may alter their behaviour, inde-
pendent of the experimental treatment. In a series of experiments designed to investigate
the eets of lighting on produtivity at the Hawthorne plant of General Eletri, researhers
allegedly found suh results. It is noteworthy, however, that, in a re-examination of data from
the Hawthorne plant, Jones (1992) found no evidene of suh eets.
5
This sometimes happens when the blok has been unexpetedly prepared, sreefed.
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Table 1
Summary Statistis: Full Sample, 197 Observations
Variable Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 944.03 341.92 375 1965
Regular Piee Rate 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.23
Piee Rate Paid 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.28
Daily Earnings ($CAD) 214.77 69.25 89.70 451.95
on three dierent bloks, over a three-month period in the spring and summer of 2003,
109 on ontrol plots and 88 on treatment plots. The piee rates paid to planters during
the experiment ranged from 18 to 28 ents per seedling, with an average of 23 ents.
The regular (or ontrol) piee rates ranged from 18 to 23 ents per seedling, with an
average of 21 ents. On average, workers planted 944 seedlings per day and earned
$215 (Canadian) per day.
To highlight the endogeneity problem in \non-experimental" data, we regressed
the logarithm of trees planted eah day on the logarithm of the regular piee rate
paid using the 109 ontrol-group observations. In Table 2, we present the results
from estimating the following regression model:
logY
ij
= 
0;i
+ 
1
log r
j
+ U
ij
(4.1)
where Y
ij
represents trees planted by individual i on blok j, r
j
represents the piee
rate reeived per tree planted on blok j, and 
0;i
is a, possibly individual-spei,
interept. When individual-spei heterogeneity is ignored, the estimates in olumn
(a) of Table 2 suggest that inreasing the piee rate dereases average produtivity;
the estimated elastiity of produtivity with respet to the piee rate is  2:46 and
statistially signiant. Admitting individual-spei heterogeneity in the interept
| olumn (b) of Table 2 | results in an inreased estimated elastiity, but it is still
negative,  1:77, and statistially signiant.
The negative oeÆient estimate on the logarithm of the piee rate paid to
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Table 2
Simple Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Daily Prodution
Sample Size = 109
Independent Variable (a) (b)
Constant 2:901 3:842
(0.290) (0.394)
Logarithm of Piee Rate Paid  2:461  1:774
(0.186) (0.265)
Maximum Individual Eet 0:572
(0.137)
Minimum Individual Eet  0:281
(0.081)
R
2
0:620 0:863
planters is troubling from the perspetive of inentive theory. Taken literally, it
suggests that when the piee rate is high planters work less intensively than when
the piee rate is low. An alternative explanation is that the piee rate is endogenous
to the statistial model. In partiular, if piee rates are orrelated with unobserved
fators that also aet planter produtivity, then the observed piee rate will be
orrelated with the error term U
ij
in equation (4.1).
6
This orrelation will result
in biased and inonsistent estimates of the elastiity of produtivity with respet to
piee rates beause one of the maintained assumptions of least-squares estimation has
been violated.
Having experimental data avoids the endogeneity problem by providing exoge-
nous variation in the piee rate for a given set of planting onditions. In Tables 3
and 4, we present the summary statistis for the regular (or ontrol) and treatment
data sets whih ontain 109 and 88 observations, respetively. The average piee rate
reeived by planters in the ontrol group was about 21 ents per tree, while in the
6
The way in whih the rm hooses the piee rate as a funtion of planting onditions generates
this orrelation; see Setion 2.2.
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Table 3
Summary Statistis: Control Sample, 109 Observations
Variable Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 888.85 325.46 390 1765
Piee Rate 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.23
Daily Earnings 182.65 50.40 89.70 317.70
Maximum Daily 13.76 4.40 8.00 21.10
Temperature (Celsius)
Daily Preipitation 5.23 7.54 0.00 26.40
(Millimetres)
Cumulative-Days-Worked 0.99 0.98 0 3
Table 4
Summary Statistis: Treatment Sample, 88 Observations
Variable Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 1012.385 351.23 375 1965
Piee Rate Paid 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.28
Daily Earnings 254.56 68.98 105.00 451.95
Maximum Daily 16.11 7.08 8.40 25.60
Temperature (Celsius)
Daily Preipitation 3.09 4.31 0.00 13.40
(Millimetres)
Cumulative-Days-Worked 1.52 1.03 0 3
treatment group it was about 26 ents per tree. On average, the ontrol group planted
888 seedlings per day, while the treatment group planted 1012 seedlings.
To onsider the statistial signiane of our results further, we augmented
equation (4.1) to inorporate experimental variation in the data. In partiular, we
onsidered the following regression:
logY
ij
= 
0;ij
+ 
1
log ~p
j
+ U
ij
(4.2)
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Table 5
Treatment/Control Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Daily Prodution
Sample Size = 197
Independent Variable
Constant 7:577
(0.153)
Logarithm of ~p 0:393
(0.089)
Maximum Individual Eet 0:527
(0.083)
Minimum Individual Eet  0:314
(0.056)
Maximum Site Eet  0:413
(0.046)
Minimum Site Eet  0:545
(0.048)
R
2
0:881
where ~p
j
represents the piee rate paid on a partiular blok; i.e.,
~p
j
=

p
j
for treatment group observations
r
j
for ontrol group observations,
and 
0;ij
represents a onstant term that is individual and blok spei. Note
that the exogenous variation in the piee rate diretly identies the elastiity of
produtivity with respet to piee rates. The results from estimating equation (4.2)
are presented in Table 5.
The estimated elastiity is positive, 0:39, and statistially signiant, but smaller
than previous estimates. Paarsh and Shearer (1999) estimated a lower bound to the
elastiity to be over 0:77, while Haley (2003) estimated it to be over 0:41.
7
7
The point estimate of the elastiity alulated by Paarsh and Shearer was over 2, while
Haley's was 1:5. We disuss reasons for the dierenes in estimates in setion 6. Note too
that, while the estimates of Paarsh and Shearer (1999) and Haley (2003) are estimates of
the eort elastiity, the omparison is still valid beause their models imply equality between
eort and produtivity elastiities.
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5. Controlling for Confounding Eets
Given the before-after nature of the experiment, it is important to aount for the
eets of other fators whih ould be hanging at the same time as the experimental
treatment and whih ould possibly aet produtivity. We onentrated on two,
weather and fatigue.
5.1. Role of Weather
To ontrol for weather, we olleted data on daily rainfall as well as the maximum
daily-temperature for the days and the regions in whih the experiment took plae.
We augmented the experimental regression to inlude these variables, onsidering the
following regression:
logY
ij
= 
0;ij
+ 
1
log ~p
j
+ 
2
Temp
ij
+ 
3
Preip
ij
+ U
ij
(5.1)
The results from (5.1) are presented in Table 6. We present three sets of results. In the
rst olumn, we give least-squares (OLS) oeÆient estimates. In the seond olumn,
we present OLS standard errors and, in the third and fourth olumns, we present,
respetively, heterosedasti-onsistent standard errors, and robust heterosedasti-
onsistent standard errors that admit for non-independent observations due to om-
mon, unobserved, daily shoks. The assoiated p-values are given in parentheses.
The rainfall and temperature oeÆients are statistially insigniant and their
inlusion has little eet on the prodution elastiity estimate.
8
This suggests that
maro-weather shoks are not playing a major role.
5.2. The Role of Fatigue
Another, potentially onfounding, element that ould inuene the ANOVA results is
worker fatigue. Sine the piee rate was inreased only after planting was ompleted
8
A joint test of the hypothesis that the oeÆients on rainfall and temperature are zero produes
p-values of 0:56 (OLS standard errors), 0:54 (heterosedasti-robust standard errors), and 0:12
(robust heterosedasti standard errors with non-independent observations).
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Table 6
Treatment/Control Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Daily Prodution
Sample Size = 197
Independent Variable CoeÆient OLS Robust Robust
Estimate Std Error Std Error Std Error
(Independene) (Clustering)
Constant 7:554 0.229 0.275 0.225
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Logarithm of ~p 0:398 0.100 0.113 0.117
(0.000) (.001) (0.003)
Maximum Individual 0:525 0.083 0.052 0.046
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minimum Individual  0:315 0.056 0.058 0.057
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maximum Site  0:402 0.073 0.079 0.050
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minimum Site  0:547 0.083 0.093 0.064
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maximum Daily 0:001 0.005 0.005 0.004
Temperature (0.307) (0.778) (0.731)
Total Daily 0:002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Preipitation (0.760) (0.297) (0.068)
R
2
0:881
at the regular rate, workers may, in general, be more tired on treatment-rate days
than on ontrol-rate days. We hose to proxy fatigue by umulative days worked sine
the last day of rest. From Tables 3 and 4, average umulative-days-worked are higher
on treatment-rate days (1:52) than on ontrol-rate days (0.99). A Poisson regression
of days worked on a dummy variable indiating treatment-rate days suggests that the
dierene is statistially signiant; the p-value for the equality of means is 0:001.
To ontrol for fatigue, we inluded umulative-days-worked diretly into the
onditional mean funtion for produtivity and used regression analysis. These results
15
Table 7
Regression Results: Fatigue
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Daily Prodution
Sample Size = 197
Independent Variable CoeÆient OLS Robust Robust
Estimate Std Error Std Error Std Error
(Independene) (Clustering)
Constant 7:541 0.160 0.157 0.177
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Logarithm of ~p 0:376 0.092 0.091 0.108
(0.000) (.000) (0.003)
Maximum Individual 0:530 0.083 0.052 0.047
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minimum Individual  0:312 0.056 0.058 0.054
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maximum Site  0:409 0.049 0.041 0.034
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minimum Site  0:543 0.048 0.042 0.041
Eet (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cumulative-Days- 0:007 0.010 0.011 0.012
Worked (0.453) (0.660) (0.602)
R
2
0:881
are presented in Table 7.
Cumulative-days-worked have no statistially signiant eet on produtivity in
the sample. What is more, the estimate of the elastiity of produtivity with respet
to the piee rate hanges very little with its inlusion.
5.3. The Role of Partiipation
If unobservable fators also aet fatigue levels, then optimal partiipation deisions
may trunate the error term of observed produtivity. Partiipation deisions an lead
to two, possibly opposing, eets. First, workers who partiipate on treatment-rate
days are likely to have lower-than-average levels of fatigue, giving rise to a standard
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Table 8
Cumulative-Days-Worked and Partiipation
Partiipation
Cumulative-Days-Worked 0 1 Total
0 2 58 60
1 0 66 66
2 1 43 44
3 1 30 31
Total 4 197 201
sample-seletion problem. Counterating this, the experimental inrease in the piee
rate an diretly aet worker partiipation; the higher rents under the treatment
piee rate ould indue workers to show up to work at fatigue levels that would
normally ause them to stay home.
In this subsetion, we exploit the fat that absenes were reorded during the
experiment. Sine these absenes ourred on days for whih the experiment took
plae, they were voluntary absenes on the part of the planters. Furthermore, sine
everyone involved in the experiment reeived the same piee rate on a given day, we
know what piee rate a planter forwent by her or his absene.
To investigate the importane of partiipation deisions in our sample, we do-
ument, in Table 8, partiipation and umulative-days-worked during the experiment.
The partiipation rate during the experiment was extremely high, around 98 per-
ent; workers deided not to work on only 4 days during the experiment. What is
more, there is little to suggest that fatigue aused these deisions. Two of the non-
partiipation days ourred at the beginning of the week, before any planting had
taken plae. This suggests that seletion is of minor importane.
In Table 9, we doument that partiipation deisions are almost idential between
treatment and ontrol groups. The partiipation rates are 97:8 perent and 98:2
perent, respetively, suggesting that the experimental variation in the piee rate had
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Table 9
Partiipation in Treatment and Control Groups
Partiipation
0 1 Total
Treatment 2 88 90
Control 2 109 111
Total 4 197 201
a negligible eet on partiipation.
As a nal indiation of the importane of partiipation in our results, we esti-
mated a Probit model linking partiipation to umulative-days-worked and experi-
mental rents. This allowed us to examine whether experimental variation in the piee
rate aeted partiipation, for a given number of days worked. In partiular, we
onsidered the following model:
P

it
= Æ
0
+ Æ
1
Days
it
+ Æ
2
(log ep  log r) + U
it
; (5.2)
estimated using the experimental sample. Here, Æ
1
aptures the eet of umulative-
days-worked Days
it
on partiipation deisions, while Æ
2
aptures the eet of ex-
perimental rents (log ~p   log r). Sine we observe the individual absenes in this
sample and sine we know the piee rate that was paid on any given day, the term
(log ~p  log r) is dened for every individual in the experimental sample, even on days
they did not work.
The estimation results are presented in Table 10. No evidene exists suggesting
that umulative-days-worked or variation in the piee rate had any aet on partii-
pation during the experiment.
Given these high partiipation rates, and their similarities between the ontrol
and treatment groups, we ignored endogenous partiipation deisions as an important
fator aeting our ANOVA results.
9
9
We have also estimated a omplete strutural model inorporating partiipation deisions and
18
Table 10
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates: Probit Model
Dependent Variable: Partiipation
Independent Variable CoeÆient Std. Error p-Value
Constant 2:102 0:354 0:000
Cumulative-Days-Worked  0:001 0:191 0:995
(log ~p  log r)  0:440 1:870 0:814
Log. Likelihood Funtion  19:600
6. A Strutural Model
Above, we have provided estimates of the response of worker output to experimental
hanges in the piee rate. Yet it may be of interest to onsider the prot performane
of the observed ontrat vis-a-vis alternative ontrats. This presents two potential
problems. First, behaviour may hange when ontrats hange. Eort levels are sensi-
tive to ontrats and must be predited as ontrats hange. Seond, any omparison
must onsider ontrats that are aeptable to both the rm and the workers; i.e., a
proposed ontrat must satisfy expeted-utility onstraints. Taking these fators into
aount requires estimating a strutural model in whih the parameters determining
worker utility and produtivity are identied.
In this setion, we develop and estimate a simple strutural model of worker and
rm behaviour under the observed piee-rate ontrat. We exploit the experimental
variation in the piee rate to identify the parameters of the model. These parameters
are then used, in setion 7, to onsider the relative performane of the observed on-
trat, onentrating on the marginal benet of introduing a base wage. Importantly,
we estimate the strutural model without imposing the assumption of expeted-prot
maximization: To wit, ontrats are only hosen to ensure the marginal worker's par-
produtivity deisions based on observable and unobservable fators. The results were very
similar to those presented. Given partiipation does not seem to be playing a signiant role
in the experiment, we have omitted these results from the paper.
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tiipation.
10
We then \test" for the optimality of the observed ontrat by solving
for the optimal base-wage ontrat (given the estimated strutural parameters) and
omparing would-be expeted prots to those earned under the observed ontrat.
6.1. Produtivity
To begin, we assume that daily produtivity Y is determined by
Y = ES
where E represents the worker's eort level, S is a produtivity shok represent-
ing planting onditions beyond the worker's ontrol, suh as the hardness of the
ground. We assume that S follows a lognormal distribution with parameters  and

2
. Planters have a utility funtion U dened over earnings I and eort E. For a
given piee rate r, earnings I equal rY or rES. We assume that the ost of eort
funtion for planter i has the following form:
C(E) = 
i

( + 1)
E
(+1)


i
> 0 ;  > 0
where 
i
denotes the planter-spei omponent of osts and  haraterizes the
urvature of C(). We assume further a utility funtion separable in I and E having
the following form:
U(I; E) =

I   C(E)

=

rES   
i

( + 1)
E
(+1)


: (6.1)
10
This is onsistent with the manner in whih the rm hooses the piee rate; see setion 2.
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Timing
For eah blok of land, j; to be planted, the timing of events in the model is as follows:
1. Nature hooses (
j
; 
2
j
) for blok j.
2. The rm observes (
j
; 
2
j
) and then selets a piee rate r
j
.
3. The worker observes (
j
; 
2
j
) for blok j, and is oered the ontrat r
j
for planting
on that blok; the planter either aepts or rejets the ontrat.
4. Conditional on aepting the ontrat the worker is randomly assigned to plant
on a partiular plot of blok j (i.e., the planter draws a partiular value of S).
The planter then hooses an eort level E and produes Y .
5. The rm observes Y and pays earnings I.
6.2. Control-Group Observations
Letting e
i
denote the optimal level of eort hosen by worker i, then onditional on
s; a partiular value of S, a worker's optimal eort is given by
e
i
=

rs

i


whih then yields the following observed-produtivity equation:
y
i
=
r



i
s
+1
: (6.2)
In order for a worker to aept the ontrat oered, it must satisfy his expeted-
utility onstraint. Given the ontrat has only one instrument and workers are
heterogeneous, some workers will earn rents. We assume that the piee rate is hosen
to satisfy the alternative utility onstraint of the lowest-ability (or marginal) worker
in the rm. The worker with the lowest ability level has the highest ost parameter

h
; i.e.,

h
= max(
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
):
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As suh, r solves the marginal worker's expeted-utility onstraint
r
(+1)
exp[( + 1)+ 0:5( + 1)
2

2
℄
( + 1)

h
= u: (6.3)
Taking logarithms and substituting from equation (6.3) into equation (6.2) yields the
following empirial speiation in terms of random variables:
logY
ij
= log( + 1) + log u  log r
j
+  log


h

i

  0:5( + 1)
2

2
j
+ V
ij
(6.4)
where V
ij
equals ( + 1)(logS
ij
  
j
) is distributed normally with mean zero and
variane ( + 1)
2

2
j
.
6.3. Treatment-Group Observations
Under our experiment, the piee rate on blok j is exogenously inreased from r
j
to p
j
for part of the blok, hosen at random and omprising the treatment plots.
Worker produtivity on the treatment plots is then given by the following observed-
produtivity equation:
y
ij
=
p

j


i
s
+1
: (6.5)
Given that onditions have not hanged, r
j
still satises equation (6.3), yielding the
following empirial speiation in terms of random variables:
logY
ij
= log( + 1)+ log u  log r
j
+  log


h

i

 
0:5( + 1)
2

2
j
+  log

p
j
r
j

+ V
ij
:
(6.6)
6.4. Identiation Results
To identify the parameters of the model, we ombine equations (6.4) and (6.6) to
yield
logY
ij
= log(+1)+log u log r
j
+ log


h

i

 0:5(+1)
2

2
j
+ log

~p
j
r
j

+V
ij
(6.7)
or
logY
ij
= a
0
+ log( + 1)  log r
j
+ a
1i
  0:5( + 1)
2

2
j
+  log

~p
j
r
j

+ V
ij
: (6.8)
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Theorem 1: Identiation
Part a)
If the marginal individual h is in the experimental sample, then maximum-
likelihood estimation of (6.8) on the experimental sample identies the parame-
ters:
i) ;
ii) 
j
8j;
iii) [log(
h
)  log(
i
)℄;
iv) log u.
Part b)
If the marginal individual h is not in the experimental sample, then maximum-
likelihood estimation of (6.8) on the experimental sample identies the parame-
ters:
i) ;
ii) 
j
8j;
iii) [log(
1
)  log(
i
)℄;
iv) log u+ [log(
h
)  log(
1
)℄.
Proof of Theorem 1
Part a)
The experimental dierene between ~p
j
and r
j
diretly identies . Given , the
variane of log y on a given plot identies 
2
j
. Given individual h is in the sample the
individual spei term, a
1i
; identies [log(
h
)  log(
i
)℄ and the onstant term then
identies log u.
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Part b)
When individual h is not in the experimental sample, the onstant term identies
log u + [log(
h
)   log(
1
)℄, where 
1
is the eort ost of the normalized individual
1. The individual-spei parameter, a
1i
; identies [log(
1
)  log(
i
)℄.
The marginal benet of experimental data vis-a-vis non-experimental data for
estimating the strutural model is now lear. Experimental variation in the piee rate
diretly identies the elastiity of eort.
11
In the absene of suh variation, when ~p
j
equals r
j
, identifying  requires a measure of alternative utility, u and the estimated
value of  will be sensitive to any suh measure.
12
6.5. Empirial Results
We estimated equation (6.7) using the experimental data. The results are presented
in Table 11, olumn (a). The estimate of the elastiity of eort with respet to the
piee rate  is 0:33 and its estimated standard error is 0:09. The value of the logarithm
of the likelihood funtion is 29:25.
The experimental estimate of  is statistially signiant, though substantially
smaller than that of Paarsh and Shearer (1999) or Haley (2003). What is more, from
the estimate of a
0
and , we an reover an estimate of u under the hypothesis that
the marginal individual was in the experimental sample. This yields an estimate of
u of $85:31, onsiderably larger than that imposed by Paarsh and Shearer (1999) or
Haley (2003). Given the identiation results, this suggests that the values of u used
by Paarsh and Shearer as well as Haley to identify  were too low.
6.6. Correlated Weather Shoks and Pereption Errors
Inreased exibility an be obtained in the strutural model by introduing daily
11
Note that the restritions embodied in equation (6.7) permit the interpretation of  as the
elastiity of eort with respet to the piee rate. In the absene of these restritions, the
parameter on the experimental variation in the piee rate identies the output elastiity.
12
This was the identiation strategy followed by Paarsh and Shearer (1999) as well as Haley
(2003).
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Table 11
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates: Strutural Model
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Daily Prodution
Sample Size = 197
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
Parameter (a) (b) () (d)
 0:330 0:443 0:336 0:366
(0:091) (0:167) (0:043) (0:108)
a
0
4:732 4:728 4:771 4:764
(0:051) (0:054) (0:029) (0:072)

1
0:074 0:036 0:040 0:014
(0:008) (0:110) (0:071) (0:131)

2
0:081 0:057 0:042 0:014
(0:016) (0:112) (0:063) (0:131)

3
0:138 0:104 0:103 0:100
(0:015) (0:109) (0:072) (0:164)

W
0:045 0:024
(0:034) (0:036)


0:059 0:058
(0:046)
Logarithm of Likelihood Funtion 29:246 37:675 41:069 44:370
weather-shoks W and pereption errors . Pereption errors apture the possibility
that the rm may misjudge atual planting onditions on a given blok. Let daily
output be given by
Y = ESW
where S and W are independent random variables, with logS being distributed
normally having mean 
j
and variane 
2
j
and logW being distributed normally
having mean 
Wj
and variane 
2
W
.
13
Furthermore, we assume that the value of W
13
We plae a subsript on average weather-shoksW
j
to denote the fat that the rm's expeta-
tions of weather shoks may dier aross ontrats beause they take plae at dierent times
of the year. We do not allow these expetations to hange daily sine expeted weather will
aet the setting of the piee rate and the piee rate is onstant for a given ontrat.
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is observed after partiipation deisions are made, but before eort is hosen. To
aount for pereption errors on a given blok, we assume that at the beginning of
the ontrat both the rm and the worker observe ~
j
, an unbiased estimate of true
onditions 
j
; i.e.,

j
= ~
j
+ 
j

j
 N(0; 
2

); E(
j
j~
j
) = 0:
Optimal eort is
e
i
=

rsw

i


:
Substituting into produtivity and taking logarithms yields
logY
i
=  log r    log
i
+ ( + 1) logS + ( + 1) logW: (6.9)
The piee rate is hosen to satisfy
r
+1
j
exp[( + 1)~
j
+ 0:5( + 1)
2
(
2
j
+ 
2

)℄ exp[( + 1)
Wj
+ 0:5( + 1)
2

2
W
℄
( + 1)

h
= u: (6.10)
Substituting equation (6.10) into equation (6.9) yields
logY
ijt
= log u+ log( + 1)  log r
j
+ (log 
h
  log 
i
) 
0:5( + 1)
2
 

2
j
+ 
2
W
+ 
2


+ (log ~p
j
  log r
j
) + "
ijt
(6.11)
where
"
ijt
= ( + 1)
 
logW
t
  
Wj

+ ( + 1)(logS
ij
  
j
) + ( + 1)
j
:
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The error struture is given by
E("
ijt
) = 0
E("
itj
"
itj
) = ( + 1)
2
(
2
j
+ 
2
W
+ 
2

)
E("
ijt
"
i
0
j
0
t
) = ( + 1)
2

2
W
E("
ijt
"
i
0
jt
0
) = ( + 1)
2

2

E("
ijt
"
ij
0
t
0
) = 0
E("
ijt
"
i
0
jt
) = ( + 1)
2
(
2
W
+ 
2

)
E("
ijt
"
ijt
0
) = ( + 1)
2

2

E("
ijt
"
ij
0
t
) = ( + 1)
2

2
W
:
(6.12)
Estimates of dierent versions of equation (6.11) are presented in Table 11 | olumns
(b), (), and (d). In olumn (b), we admit weather shoks, but no pereption errors;
i.e., 
W
is positive, while 

is zero. The estimate of  is 0:44 and the value of the
logarithm of the likelihood funtion inreases to 37:68. In olumn (), we present
estimates of the model without weather shoks, but admitting pereption errors; i.e.,

W
is zero, while 

is positive. The estimate of  is 0:34 and the value of the
logarithm of the likelihood is 41:07. Finally, in olumn (d), we present estimates of
the model admitting both pereption errors and weather shoks; i.e., 
W
and 

are
both positive. Here, the estimate of  is 0:37 and the value of the logarithm of the
likelihood funtion inreases to 44:37.
14
In general, the individual variane-parameters are not preisely estimated, al-
though the value of the logarithm of the likelihood funtion inreases substantially
14
Stritly speaking, we annot ompare models with varianes set to zero using the standard
likelihood-ratio test as the variane parameters, when set to zero, are on the boundary of
the parameter spae, so standard, rst-order asymptoti methods are invalid. Here, we do
so simply to provide the reader with some feeling for how muh better the models t when
pereption errors and daily weather-shoks are inluded.
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by their inlusion. At the same time, the estimated eort elastiity is reasonably
stable, ranging from 0:33 to 0:44.
6.7. Goodness-of-Fit
In order to evaluate the performane of the strutural model, we alulated 95-perent
ondene intervals for the predited values of the logarithm of daily produtivity.
We onentrated on the version of the model with pereption errors and random daily
shoks. In Figure 1, we present these ondene intervals, along with the atual obser-
vations, by individual employee. To avoid lutter, we plaed the observation number
on the horizontal axis. The ondene interval orresponding to eah observation
is marked by a \C" to denote ontrol observations and a \T" to denote treatment
observations. The atual observation is symbolized by the regular piee rate for the
plot on whih the observation ourred. The logarithm of daily produtivity is given
on the vertial axis.
The model ts the data quite well, although, in strit terms, the model is rejeted
by the data. In all, ninety perent of the observations fall within the 95-perent
ondene intervals. What is more, sine the output and eort elastiities oinide in
our model, we an ompare the estimated output elastiity from the strutural model
to that from the ANOVA model. We note that these parameters are very lose,
0:37 for the strutural model and 0:39 for the ANOVA model; any mis-speiation
does not aet the estimate of worker reation to inentives. This is not surprising
sine identiation of this parameter omes mainly through the exogenous hange in
the piee rate. This highlights the benets of small-sale experiments. As always,
however, there is a trade-o in the appliation of strutural models to data. Invariably,
strutural models do not t the data as well as their unrestrited ounterparts.
However, strutural models allow one to make behavioural interpretations of the
results and to investigate alternative poliies unobserved during the experiment. We
develop this latter point in the next setion.
28
7. Poliy Analysis: Alternative Contrats and Firm Prots
Estimating the strutural model allows us to predit the performane of alternative
ontrats, not observed during the experiment. It is noteworthy that the observed
ontrat has only one instrument, the piee rate. Given hanging planting onditions,
the piee rate must aomplish two tasks | provide inentives for eort and guarantee
labour supply. A ontrat that inludes a base wage allows the rm to separate
the tasks of two instruments, the piee rate providing inentives and the base wage
satisfying labour supply. In this setion, we onsider how introduing a base wage into
the ontrat would aet rm prots. Initially, we restrit the alternative ontrat to
be independent of worker type (as is the observed ontrat), extending this later to
allow the rm to ondition on worker ability.
Information Assumption 1.
The rm an write ontrats on the set f; 
2
; 
h
; f
K
(
i
); g,
where f
K
(
i
) is the distribution of ability levels in the rm. Throughout, we assume
that individual type is independent of produtivity and daily weather-shoks.
The base-wage ontrat inludes a base wage B and a piee rate R and, for blok
j, takes the following form:
I = B
j
+R
j
Y:
As with the observed piee-rate ontrat, the base-wage ontrat is independent of
worker type. This is onsistent with two senarios: First, the rm annot observe
worker type 
i
; seond, the rm an observe worker type, but annot write (or refrains
from writing) a ontrat on it. To ompare ontrats, we denote
E(r) =

rsw

i


the eort level under the observed piee-rate ontrat, and
E(B;R) =

Rsw

i


29
the eort level under the alternative base-wage ontrat.
We solve for the base-wage ontrat that would ensure the marginal worker
ontinues to partiipate in this rm. This ensures that the distribution of types will
not hange under the new ontrat. From equation (6.1), expeted utility is given by
E(U
r
ij
) =
r
+1
j
exp[( + 1)~
j
+ 0:5( + 1)
2
(
2
j
+ 
2

)℄


i
( + 1) exp[ ( + 1)
Wj
  0:5( + 1)
2

2
W
℄
:
From equation (6.10),
r
+1
j
exp[(+1)~
j
+0:5(+1)
2
(
2
j
+
2

)℄ exp[(+1)
Wj
+0:5(+1)
2

2
W
℄ = u(+1)

h
:
Substitution yields
E(U
r
ij
) =


h

i


u:
Under the base-wage ontrat, expeted utility is given by
E [U
(B
j
;R
j
)
ij
℄ = E

B
j
+R
j
E(B
j
; R
j
)WS   
i

 + 1
E(B
j
; R
j
)
(+1)


= B
j
+
R
(+1)
j
exp[( + 1)~
j
+ 0:5( + 1)
2
(
2
j
+ 
2

)℄


i
( + 1) exp[ ( + 1)
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  0:5( + 1)
2

2
W
℄
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j
+
R
(+1)
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(+1)
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

h

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u:
Solving for a B that guarantees partiipation of the marginal worker yields
B
j
(R
j
) = u

1 
R
(+1)
j
r
(+1)
j

: (7.1)
Given B(R) and R, we an write expeted prots per worker under any base-wage
ontrat as
(P  R)R

uE


h

i



( + 1)
r
+1
  u

1 

R
r

+1

: (7.2)
Maximizing equation (7.2) with respet to R yields the following solution:
^
R =

( + )
P (7.3)
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where
 =
E

1


i

 

1


h

E

1


i

< 1 (7.4)
given 
h
equals maxf
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
g.
15
Two speial ases of the optimal ontrat imply that inentives are independent
of the distribution of worker type f
K
(
i
). First, if workers are homogeneous (
i
is the
same for all i), then  is zero and
^
R equals P . Under these irumstanes, the rm's
marginal return to inreasing the piee rate is independent of worker type and the rm
an use the base wage to reover the surplus generated by high-powered inentives.
This is the standard solution with risk-neutral agents. Seond, if the partiipation
onstraint does not bind (so 
h
!1), then  is one and the rm maximizes prots by
setting
^
R equal to [P  =(+1)℄, equating the rm's marginal revenue of inreasing
the piee rate to its marginal ost.
16
In the presene of heterogeneous workers, a
15
If the rm an observe individual ability, but annot write a ontrat on 
i
, then the rm's
expeted prots are
(P  R)R

u
( + 1)
r
+1
n
X
i=1


h

i


  nu

1 

R
r

+1

:
The optimal piee rate is then given by
^
R =

( + )
P;
where
 =
P
n
i=1

1


i

  n

1


h

P
n
i=1

1


i

:
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More generally, this solution satises the ondition
P  
^
R
^
R
=
1

(7.5)
whih is a variant of the monopolist's prie-markup equation. Here, the rm ontrols the piee
rate and sets the markup to be equal to the inverse elastiity of eort.
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ommon base wage and a binding partiipation onstraint, the rm's marginal return
to inreasing the piee rate is type-dependent; the optimal ontrat must balane
inentives aross types.
The optimal base-wage is given by substituting
^
R into equation (7.1), yielding
expeted prots per worker under the base-wage ontrat

(B;R)
= (P  
^
R)
^
R

r
+1
u( + 1)E


h

i



  u

1 

^
R
r

+1

: (7.6)
Under the piee-rate ontrat, expeted prots per worker are given by

r
=
(P   r)
r
E


h

i



u( + 1): (7.7)
We alulated expeted prots under the assumption that the marginal individual
is in the experiment. This assumption is reasonable given the struture of the rm.
Reall that the piee rate on a given ontrat is hosen by the manager responsible for
that ontrat. In eet, eah manager operates his own independent rm within the
ompany, setting piee rates and hiring workers. Sine the experiment was ompleted
on one suh \rm," it is not unreasonable to assume that the marginal worker is
present.
17
In Table 12 (a), we present a summary of ontratual performane on eah
experimental blok, evaluated at the estimates from Table 11 (d); i.e., admitting
daily weather-shoks and pereption errors. In the rst olumn, we present the piee
rate paid under the atual ontrat, while in the seond olumn we present the prie
per tree planted reeived by the rm. In the third olumn we present the optimal
piee rate under the base-wage ontrat. In the fourth olumn, we present the base-
wage paid under the base-wage ontrat; in the fth olumn, we present expeted
prots under the atual piee-rate ontrat; in the sixth olumn, we present expeted
17
If the marginal individual were not in the data set, then the analysis would still go through,
with a slight hange in interpretation; viz., by redening the base wage to satisfy the expeted
utility of the highest-ost individual in the sample, we an alulate the prots aruing from
rendering that individual indierent between ontrats.
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prots under the base-wage ontrat; and, in the seventh olumn, we present the
perent inrease in expeted prot by swithing to the base-wage ontrat.
We estimate the inrease in expeted prots to be less than one perent in
all three ases. This suggests that the atual ontrat, whih sets the base wage
to zero on all bloks, is very lose to being the optimal linear ontrat; to a rst
approximation, the rm's hoie of ontrats is maximizing expeted prots. We now
turn to evaluating the importane of information over worker type on ontrats and
prots.
7.1. Information over Worker Type
To onsider the importane of information to rm prots, we relax the restrition
prohibiting the rm to ondition the ontrat on worker type.
Information Assumption 2.
The rm an write ontrats on the set f; 
2
; 
h
; 
i
; g,
If the rm an ondition on worker type, then the optimal ontrat is to sell the
rights to plant trees on a partiular blok of land to eah worker. Sine workers earn
rents under the urrent ontrat, a base-wage ontrat will have two eets: First, it
will allow the rm to tailor the ontrat to eah individual; seond, it will allow the
rm to apture rents. To deompose the importane of eah element in the ontrat,
we distinguish two ases: First, we impose that the base-wage ontrat ensures eah
worker obtains her or his urrent level of utility, equal to


h

i


u:
We all these ontrats onstant-utility ontrats. Any inrease in expeted prots
from the base-wage ontrat under these onditions is attributed to onditioning on
individual type; seond, we allow the rm to redue the base wage to apture all of
the rent from eah worker, ensuring that eah worker earns the alternative utility
level, u. We all these ontrats alternative-utility ontrats.
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Table 12 (a)
Base-Wage Contrat Expeted Prots
Blok Rate Prie Optimal Base 
r

(B;R)
Perent
Paid Rate Wage Inrease
I 0.18 0.33 0.16 14.45 166.84 168.09 0.7%
II 0.23 0.43 0.20 13.35 170.95 172.01 0.6%
III 0.23 0.47 0.22 3.23 207.88 207.94 0.0%
Table 12 (b)
Constant-Utility Base-Wage Contrat Expeted Prots
Blok Rate Optimal Base 
r

(B;R)
Perent
Paid Rate Wage Inrease
I 0.18 0.33  189:15 166.84 189.15 13.4%
II 0.23 0.43  194:23 170.95 194.23 13.6%
III 0.23 0.47  241:54 207.88 241.54 16.2%
Table 12 ()
Alternative-Utility Base-Wage Contrat Expeted Prots
Blok Rate Optimal Base 
r

(B;R)
Perent
Paid Rate Wage Inrease
I 0.18 0.33  248:00 166.84 248.00 48.6%
II 0.23 0.43  253:15 170.95 253.15 48.1%
III 0.23 0.47  300:39 207.88 300.39 44.5%
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Case A: Constant-Utility Contrats
The base wage that keeps worker i indierent between the piee-rate ontrat and
the base-wage ontrat is given by
B
ij
(R) = u


h

i



1 
R
(+1)
r
(+1)

: (7.8)
Therefore, expeted prots per worker are given by
(P   R)R

u


h

i


( + 1)
r
+1
  u


h

i



1 

R
r

+1

: (7.9)
Maximizing expeted prots over R yields the standard solution
^
R
j
= P
j
B
ij
= u


h

i



1 

P
j
r
j

+1

:
(7.10)
The rm sells the rights to plant on blok j to the workers. Eah worker pays a fee
that depends on her or his ost of eort. Sine the piee rate is equal to the prie the
rm reeives per tree planted, prots per worker are equal to  B
ij
.
The relative performane of the onstant-utility base-wage ontrat is presented
in Table 12 (b). By introduing a base wage, expeted prots would inrease by
approximately fourteen perent.
Case B: Alternative-Utility Contrats
The rm an apture all of the rent that eah worker earns by setting the base wage
equal to
B
ij
(R) = u

1 


h

i


R
(+1)
r
(+1)

: (7.11)
The optimal ontrat is then given by
^
R
j
= P
j
B
ij
= u

1 


h

i



P
r

+1

:
(7.12)
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We alulated the expeted prots assoiated with eah of these ontrats in Table
12 (). If the rm were to apture all of the rents workers earn, then expeted prots
would inrease by between forty-four and forty-nine perent.
8. Disussion and Conlusions
Eonomists are inreasingly turning to experiments to gather data onerning in-
dividual behaviour. Experiments allow for the exogenous alloation of treatments,
simplifying identiation and estimation. Field experiments extend the benets of ex-
ogenous variation in treatments to real-world data, failitating the generalization of
statistial results; see, for example, Frenh (1953). Field experiments provide a sim-
ple, yet powerful, tool for analyzing the eets of dierent personnel poliies within
the rm.
We have analyzed data from one suh eld experiment whih was designed to
measure the reation of workers to hanges in piee-rate inentives. Experimental
variation in the piee rate allows for the diret measurement of reations within an
unrestrited framework. Our results suggest that workers do reat to inentives. We
estimate an output elastiity with respet to hanges in the piee rate of 0:39. This
aords with previous results obtained by Paarsh and Shearer (1999) as well as
Haley (2003): Piee-rate payment systems do aet worker behaviour. On a broader
sale, our results are also onsistent with the literature investigating inentive eets.
Speially, as Paarsh and Shearer (2000), Lazear (2000), and Shearer (2004) have
also found, inentives do matter.
We have also onsidered the relative benets of estimating strutural and eono-
metri models using experimental data. In general, the ability to generalize exper-
imental results to evaluate poliies unobserved within the experimental setting rep-
resents the major advantage of strutural estimation. In fat, experiments are also
beneial to strutural estimation methods, providing exogenous variation whih re-
dues the sensitivity of the results to funtional-form assumptions.
Our results point to the importane of worker heterogeneity within the rm as a
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determinant of ontratual performane. Indeed, if heterogeneity is ignored, then the
observed ontrat is loally optimal { adding a base wage would have a negligible eet
on expeted prots. In ontrast, onditioning the base wage on worker type would
inrease expeted prots substantially. This raises the question of why ontrats are
independent of worker type. One possible explanation is that the rm does not know
worker type. However, given the nature of the work and the fat that the rm gathers
worker produtivity reords for payroll purposes, this does not seem to be plausible.
An alternative explanation deals with ontrating osts. In partiular, whereas the
piee-rate ontrat is only plot spei, the base-wage ontrat is individual and
plot spei. The osts of negotiating suh a ontrat may outweigh the benets
of its implementation. We nd that the rm forgoes a fourteen perent inrease in
expeted prots by ignoring heterogeneity. One interpretation is that these results
provide a lower bound to the ost of implementing suh a ontrat. Further benets
are predited were the rm to use the base wage to extrat rents from eah worker.
However, under suh irumstanes, workers would have an inentive to mis-represent
their abilities. This points to intertemporal ommitment as an important determinant
of observed ontrats: The rm ommits to refrain from using information over worker
type in order to indue high-ability workers to reveal their type.
Our results also suggest a number of diretions for future researh. Inome
eets may aet eort elastiities as they do other labour-supply deisions. Indeed,
to the extent that inome eets are important, our results on the introdution of
a base wage may be overstated. In general, it is diÆult to identify an inome and
a substitution eet from hanges in the piee rate alone. Experimental methods
are an obvious remedy, allowing researhers to vary both the piee rate and a base
wage independently. Dikens (1999) has provided an example within a laboratory
setting; eld experiments would provide the opportunity to onrm his results within
the labour market. Dynami elements are also highlighted within the ontrating
environment. We have identied the rm's ommitment to ignore worker type as
important in implementing the observed ontrat. The rm may also have inentive
37
to hange the ontrat as information onerning planting onditions are revealed.
Extending empirial models to expliitly inorporate learning over onditions and
ommitment will provide insight into the empirial importane of these issues.
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